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SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN ARKANSAS:
CELOTEX, THE SCINTILLA RULE, AND OTHER
MATTERS
John J. Watkins*
Several years ago, a sign outside a federal courtroom in New Orle-
ans warned "No Spitting, No Summary Judgments."1 That statement
reflected the prevailing attitude in the federal courts, which viewed
summary judgment as a nefarious device that was to be employed spar-
ingly, if at all.2 In 1986, however, the Supreme Court announced a new
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
1. Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme
Court, 6 REV. LITIG. 263, 264 (1987).
2. Writing in 1957, an Arkansas federal district judge called summary judgment "a drastic
remedy [that] is to be sparingly used." Harry J. Lemley, Summary Judgment Procedure under
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Its Use and Abuse, 11 ARK. L. REV. 138, 142
(1957). Similarly, summary judgment has been described as "an extreme and treacherous rem-
edy," Croxen v. United States Chem. Corp., 558 F. Supp. 6, 7 (N.D. Iowa 1982), one which
should be used "only with great caution and much soul-searching .... Bayou Bottling, Inc. v.
Dr. Pepper Co., 543 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (W.D. La. 1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). The Second Circuit frequently observed that the trial judge must
deny a motion for summary judgment if there is "the slightest doubt" as to its propriety. E.g.,
Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v.
United States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d cir. 1945)). A prominent litigator, discussing summary
judgment at the Second Circuit judicial conference in 1977, observed that "[t]here is none in this
circuit" and that "it takes a touch of Pollyanna for any of us to even consider the motion any
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approach. "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut," the Court said in Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett,3 "but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action.' "
The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, continues to cling to the
old ways. Although the court has applied the actual holding of Celotex
in one case, 5 it has not accepted the notion that summary judgment is a
perfectly respectable method of disposing of lawsuits short of trial. In
fact, a recent decision 6 seems to adopt the infamous "scintilla rule,"
under which a motion for summary judgment will be denied so long as
there is the smallest trace of evidence in support of the party opposing
the motion.'
This hostile attitude toward summary judgment is unfortunate.
Like their counterparts in most states, trial judges in Arkansas face
swollen dockets, 8 and summary judgment is "an important tool for dis-
tinguishing cases that should be tried from those that should not." 9
Moreover, Rule 56 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which
deals with summary judgment, is virtually identical to the correspond-
ing federal rule.10 Following the federal rule in form but not manner of
longer." Lawrence W. Pierce, Summary Judgment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving
Disputes, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 279, 279 (1987).
3. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4. Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
5. Short v. Little Rock Dodge, 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988).
6. Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 818 S.W.2d 940 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Wilson v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 331 So.2d 617, 619-20 (Ala. 1976).
Discussing the rule in connection with motions for directed verdict, Professor James observed: "It
is a judicial legend that there once was a 'scintilla rule' under which a verdict could be directed
only when there was literally no evidence for proponent, but if there ever was such a notion all
that remains of it today is its universal repudiation." Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evi-
dence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 218-19 (1961)
(footnotes omitted).
8. According to the Administrative Office of the Courts, the state's trial courts "are oper-
ating at their maximum capacity, and further increases in filings could produce severe problems."
ARKANSAS JUDICIARY ANNUAL REPORT, 1990-91, at 8. There were 90,814 civil cases filed in the
state's circuit, chancery, and probate courts during 1990-91, compared to 83,247 in 1987-88.
While circuit court filings dropped from 28,356 to 23,013 during that period, the decrease is
attributable to Amendment 64, which expanded the civil jurisdiction of municipal courts. Signifi-
cantly, the number of civil cases filed in the circuit courts increased between 1989-90 and 1990-
91, despite the impact of Amendment 64. Id. Filings in municipal courts (both civil and criminal)
increased from 444,916 in 1987-88 to 619,366 in 1990-91. Id. at 10.
9. William J. Dowling, Is There Any Hope for the Celotex Rule on Summary Judgment
Motions in California?, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 493, 495 (1992).
10. The Arkansas rule tracks the version of FED. R. Civ. P. 56 that was on the books in
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application invites confusion and is inconsistent with the notion of uni-
formity between state and federal practice that underlies the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure."
I. FEDERAL PRACTICE
Traditionally, the federal courts took a narrow view of the sum-
mary judgment device, as illustrated by the oft-repeated statements
that summary judgment should not result in "trial by affidavit" and
should not be granted if there is the "slightest doubt" as to the facts. 2
The burden of proving that no material facts were in dispute rested
with the party moving for summary judgment,13 and the evidence
presented to the court was to be construed in favor of the party oppos-
ing the motion, who would be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts
in determining whether a genuine factual dispute existed. 4 Moreover,
courts would not weigh the factual inferences in evaluating summary
1978, when the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 56, re-
porter's note. In 1987, the federal rule was amended to make it gender-neutral. See Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice & Procedure, 113 F.R.D. 189, 272, 332-34 (1987). Various suggestions to amend the
federal rule have been made in recent years. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substan-
tive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989); William W. Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 F.R.D. 213 (1986). In 1989, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules proposed a substantial revision of Rule 56. See Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 105-20 (September 1989), reprinted in, 127 F.R.D. 237, 370-85 (1989). However, the
proposal stirred considerable controversy and was ultimately withdrawn. In 1991, the Advisory
Committee proposed another revision in the rule that takes into account various comments made
in connection with the 1989 proposal. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 68-78 (August 1991), re-
printed in, 137 F.R.D. 53, 141-51 (1991).
11. See Walter Cox & David Newbern, New Civil Procedure: The Court that Came in
from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979) (noting that the committee appointed by the supreme
court to draft the Arkansas rules used the federal rules as a "starting point," having been "per-
suaded by the need for modernization and the desirability of uniformity with the federal system").
12. For a discussion of cases adhering to this view, see 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL..
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2712, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983).
13. E.g., Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (a defend-
ant seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating no factual dispute, "even though
• . . he would have no burden if the case were to go to trial"); Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp.,
523 F.2d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1975) (in order to be entitled to summary judgment, the defendant
employer had burden of "conclusively" demonstrating that plaintiff employee was not discrimi-
nated against because of his race).
14. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2727, at 124-28.
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judgment motions,1 5 and the conventional wisdom was that summary
judgment was not proper when the case involved intent, knowledge, or
motive.1
In 1986, however, the Supreme Court decided three cases that
substantially reconfigured federal summary judgment practice. The im-
pact of those decisions - of which Celotex was one - cannot be un-
derstated. In a recent survey of lower federal court cases, the authors
of an article in the Yale Law Journal found "a widespread and dra-
matic recasting of summary judgment doctrine."" The courts, they
concluded, have "expand[ed] evidentiary review at the summary judg-
ment stage of litigation," granted summary judgment when the plain-
tiff's evidence "does not exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a
fair amount of certainty," and demonstrated a "new willingness" to
15. E.g., Redna Marine Corp. v. Poland, 46 F.R.D. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("It is not the
Court's function to weigh the evidence or choose between factual inferences that may be drawn.").
16. E.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (summary judgment "should be
used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles");
Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Cases where intent is a primary
issue generally are inappropriate for summary judgment .... ); Conrad v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Cases in which the underlying issue is one of motivation,
intent, or some other subjective fact are particularly inappropriate for summary judgment.").
17. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE L.J., 73, 88 (1990). The 1986 trilogy has been the subject of considerable com-
mentary. See. e.g., Robert M. Bratton, Summary Judgment Practice in the 1990s: A New Day
Has Begun - Hopefully, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 441 (1991); Childress, supra note 1; Jack H.
Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); John E. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment: Recon-
ciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adkickes v. Kress and the Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6
REV. LITIG. 227 (1987); Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A
Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment after Celotex, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 53 (1988); D.
Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Su-
preme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (1988); William W.
Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441
(1991); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95
(1988); Brian L. Weakland, Summary Judgment in Federal Practice: Super Motion v. Classic
Model of Epistemic Coherence, 94 DICK. L. REV. 25 (1989); Robert K. Smits, Comment, Federal
Summary Judgment: The "New" Workhorse for an Overburdened Federal Court System, 20
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 955 (1987); Matthew W. Wallace, Comment, Overruling Tradition: Sum-
mary Judgment in the Eleventh Circuit after 1986, 41 MERCER L. REV. 737 (1990); Kyle M.
Robertson, Note, No More Litigation Gambles: Toward a New Summary Judgment, 28 B.C. L.
REV. 747 (1987); John P. Howley, Note, Summary Judgment in Federal Court: New Maxims for
a Familiar Rule, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1989); Daniel P. Collins, Note, Summary Judg-
ment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1988).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE
resolve issues of intent or motive on summary judgment. In short, sum-
mary judgment "has been transformed into a mechanism to assess
plaintiff's likelihood of success of prevailing at trial."' 8
The first of the trilogy was Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp.," handed down in March 1986. In Matsushita a
group of American consumer electronics manufacturers brought an an-
titrust suit against a number of their Japanese counterparts who were
alleged to have conspired to use their monopoly profits from the Japa-
nese market to finance a predatory pricing campaign in the United
States aimed at driving the plaintiffs out of business. After lengthy dis-
covery and pretrial wrangling, the district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment,2 0 but the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed. After determining that the district court had
erroneously excluded certain evidence offered by the plaintiffs in oppo-
sition to the motion, including a large portion of their expert testimony,
the court of appeals held that summary judgment was improper be-
cause a reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendants had con-
spired to depress prices in the United States in order to drive out
American competitors. 2'
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, directing that the summary judgment be reinstated unless the
Third Circuit could identify other evidence in the record that was "suf-
ficiently unambiguous" to permit a conspiracy finding.22 The majority
held, on the basis of the evidence considered by the court of appeals,
that summary judgment was appropriate. Because the defendants had
adequately supported their summary judgment motion, as Rule 56(c)
requires, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate a genuine
factual dispute. To carry this burden, the Court said, the party re-
sisting summary judgment must do more than "simply show that there
is some metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts. "Where the rec-
ord taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
18. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 17, at 88-89. The new attitude is illustrated by
this comment by a Ninth Circuit panel: "No longer can it be argued that any disagreement about
a material issue of fact precludes the use of summary judgment." California Architectural Bldg.
Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1446, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).
19. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
20. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
21. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983).
22. 475 U.S. at 597. On remand, the Third Circuit affirmed the summary judgment. In re




the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' " Moreover,
that party "must come forward with more persuasive evidence to sup-
port [its] claim than would be otherwise necessary" if the claim is "im-
plausible" in light of the factual context.
2 3
The problem for the plaintiffs in Matsushita, the Court said, was
the absence of any rational economic motive for the defendants to con-
spire. Without such motive, the defendants' behavior in the Japanese
market and their pricing practices in the United States did not give rise
to an inference of conspiracy, since that conduct was "consistent with
other, equally plausible explanations. . . ." There had to be evidence
that was "sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that
[the defendants] conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite
the absence of any apparent motive to do so." Such evidence must
"ten[d] to exclude the possibility" that the defendants priced their
products "to compete for business rather than to implement an eco-
nomically senseless conspiracy." 4
If nothing else, Matsushita illustrates the impact of the underlying
substantive law on motions for summary judgment. But, as Professor
Childress has pointed out, the decision is significant for two other rea-
sons. First, the case makes clear that the standard for evaluating sum-
mary judgment motions mirrors that for directed verdict motions.28
23. 475 U.S. at 586-87.
24. Id. at 596-98. The Court returned to this issue in Eastman Kodak Co. v. image Techni-
cal Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). Although the decision speaks principally in terms of
substantive antitrust law, it may suggest some relaxation of the "economic sense" standard intro-
duced in Matsushita. The Court said:
The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims make economic sense
did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust
cases. The Court did not hold that if the moving party enunciates any economic theory
supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is
entitled to summary judgment. Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's
inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not in-
vented, but merely articulated, in that decision. If the plaintiffis theory is economically
senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be
granted.
Kodak, then, bears a substantial burden in showing that it is entitled to summary
judgment.
112 S. Ct. at 2083 (footnote omitted).
25. Previously, the federal courts treated summary judgment as different from and harder
to obtain than a directed verdict. See Stempel, supra note 17, at 144-54. Some scholars, however,
had urged that the two motions be evaluated under the same standard. E.g., David P. Currie,
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 72 (1977); Martin
B. Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Defamation Cases, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 707 (1984); Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical
[Vol. 15:1
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Thus, the question on motion for summary judgment is not "whether
enough evidence exists to raise an inference to be resolved at trial, but
instead whether sufficient evidence in the pretrial record exists to allow
the plaintiff to win at trial or survive a motion for directed verdict,
were one based on the facts in the pretrial record.' Second, the
Court's reference to plausibility suggests that a trial judge may weigh
the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, "at least for their
absolute reasonableness or persuasiveness," and thus engage in "a cer-
tain amount of qualitative review beyond a minimum quantitative suffi-
ciency-of-the-evidence test."'27 As Judge Pierce has put it, summary
judgment "may be granted in the face of equally plausible explanations
of the same evidence.
28
The parallel between the motions for summary judgment and di-
rected verdict was drawn even more clearly three months later in An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.29 In that case, a lobbying group and its
founder brought a defamation action against columnist Jack Anderson
and his associates on the basis of three magazine articles. After discov-
ery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiffs were "public figures" who had not met their burden of show-
ing that the offending articles were published with "actual malice,"
that is, reckless disregard for the truth or knowledge of falsity."0 The
district court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit reversed with respect to some of the allegedly
defamatory statements.3 " Central to the court's ruling was its conclu-
sion that the heightened standard of proof applicable in libel cases of
this type - i.e., a public official or public figure must prove actual
malice with "convincing clarity" - was irrelevant for purposes of sum-
mary judgment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding in a six to
three decision that the "convincing clarity" standard applies at the
summary judgment stage as well as at trial.
Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
26. Childress, supra note 1, at 268.
27. Id.
28. Pierce, supra note 2, at 285. However, at least one court has interpreted Matsushita as
applying only to the plausibility of inferences, not direct evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d
1205, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1988). With respect to the impact of Matsushita on the problem of
inconsistent inferences, see Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 493-95.
29. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
30. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1992]
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Anderson makes plain that, in ordinary civil cases as well as in
actions for defamation, a trial judge considering a motion for summary
judgment must take into account who has the burden of persuasion at
trial and the applicable standard of proof, usually the familiar "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard. As the Court put it, "the judge
must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden."3
Moreover, the Court flatly stated that the test for evaluating a mo-
tion for summary judgment "mirrors [that] for a directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)" and that the difference in the
two motions lies largely in their timing. 3 Thus, "[t]he mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be
insufficient," and the inquiry in the typical case is "whether reasonable
jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict."3" Trial judges must determine whether the record
on summary judgment "presents a sufficient disagreement" or "is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."35 In making
this determination, judges must "bear in mind the actual quantum and
quality of proof necessary to support liability," and summary judgment
is proper if the evidence is of "insufficient caliber or quantity" to allow
a jury to decide the issue. 6
At the same time, however, the Court cautioned that summary
judgment is not a substitute for trial: "at the summary judgment stage
the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial." ' Elaborating on this point later in the opinion, the
Court said:
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
32. 477 U.S. at 254.
33. Id. at 250. As the Court observed, "'summary judgment motions are usually made
before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial
and decided on evidence that has been admitted.'" Id. (quoting Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.l 1 (1983)).
34. Id. at 252. Put another way, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 249. "If the
evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."
Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted). On the other hand, "summary judgment will not lie . . . if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at
248.
35. Id. at 251-52.
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 249.
[Vol. 15:1
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drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.38
The Celotex case, handed down on the same day as Anderson,
dealt primarily with the process by which a summary judgment motion
is brought before the court. While the decision centered on the shifting
burdens within summary judgment procedure, its message as to the
role of summary judgment is unmistakable. As noted in the opening
paragraph of this article, the Court emphasized that summary judg-
ment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut," but rather an "integral
part" of the rules of civil procedure. 9 Indeed, the Court said that sum-
mary judgment is now the principal tool by which "factually insuffi-
cient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to
trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private
resources."
40
A products liability case, Celotex stemmed from the exposure of
the plaintiff's late husband to asbestos. After more than a year of dis-
covery, the district court granted defendant Celotex's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to produce
evidence connecting her husband's death to any of the company's prod-
ucts. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
versed, holding that Celotex's failure to support its summary judgment
motion with evidence tending to negate such causation precluded sum-
mary judgment in its favor.41 Rejecting this view of the moving party's
initial burden in seeking summary judgment, the Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the proper
standard. Again the Court was divided, this time five to four; however,
three of the four dissenters were in basic agreement with the majority
regarding summary judgment procedure.
Under Rule 56(e), a motion for summary judgment is to be "made
and supported as provided in this rule." Prior to Celotex, this ambigu-
ous requirement was taken to mean that the moving party has "the
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact," with any supporting materials "viewed in the light most
38. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). Accord,
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992).
39. 477 U.S. at 327.
40. Id.
41. Catreit v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
1992]
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favorable to the opposing party. '42 Thus, it was generally thought that
the moving party must "foreclose the possibility" that his opponent
might prevail at trial.48 As applied to the facts of Celotex, this burden
would have made summary judgment virtually impossible. Because the
plaintiff's claim was based on the alleged exposure of her deceased hus-
band to asbestos products made by Celotex, the company would have
had "to prove nonexposure at any point in the decedent's life in order
to foreclose the possibility of a plaintiff's verdict at trial."4
In Celotex, however, the Supreme Court eased the moving party's
initial burden at the summary judgment stage when the opposing party
has the burden of persuasion at trial.' While the movant may still pro-
duce affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the opposing
party's claim, he may also satisfy this burden by "pointing out" to the
trial court that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmov-
ing party's case.''46 Thus, a defendant who moves for summary judg-
ment stands in the same procedural posture as a defendant who moves
for directed verdict at trial. No matter which option is employed, the
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings
and . . .designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.' ,v Under Matsushita and Anderson, of course, this means
that the nonmoving party must identify evidence sufficient for a reason-
42. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
43. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (summary judgment was improper
where defendant had not foreclosed possibility that removal of books from school library was
unconstitutionally motivated). See generally Nelken, supra note 17, at 63-64.
44. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 17, at 80.
45. The majority did not address the burden of production of a moving party who has the
burden of persuasion at trial, as is typically the case when the plaintiff seeks summary judgment.
Justice Brennan, however, observed in dissent that the plaintiff in such a situation must support
the motion with "credible evidence ... that would entitle [him] to a directed verdict if not contro-
verted at trial." 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). If this heavy burden
is satisfied, the defendant must counter with "evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence
of a 'genuine issue' for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting additional time for discovery." Id.
(citations omitted). See also Nelken, supra note 17, at 81.
46. 477 U.S. at 325. There was disagreement among the Justices as to the precise nature of
the moving party's obligation when the "pointing out" option is chosen. Writing for a plurality of
four, Justice Rehnquist described the requirement as simply "informing" the trial court of the
absence of facts in dispute. Id. at 323. Concurring in the judgment, Justice White said that a
"conclusory assertion" that no evidence supports an element of the nonmoving party's claim is
insufficient. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by two other
Justices, agreed with Justice White that a "conclusory assertion" is not enough and took the
position that the moving party must "affirmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the
record to support a judgment for the nonmoving party." Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
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able trier of fact to find in his favor.
The Court also spoke in Celotex to the obligation of the nonmov-
ing party once the movant has satisfied his initial burden. Prior to this
decision, the generally accepted view was that the evidence offered by
the nonmoving party in opposition to a summary judgment motion had
to be admissible at trial." In Celotex, however, the Court took a differ-
ent approach: "We do not mean that the nonmoving party must pro-
duce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to
avoid summary judgment."' 9 Rather, the question is "whether [the
nonmoving party's] showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would
be sufficient to carry [that party's] burden of proof at trial."50 Thus,




On remand, a divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
again held that summary judgment was inappropriate. 5 Given the Su-
preme Court's conclusion that Celotex had met its initial burden on
summary judgment by "pointing out" the lack of evidence as to causa-
tion, the court of appeals focused on the adequacy of the plaintiff's
response to the motion. The evidence relied upon by the plaintiff con-
sisted of three documents tending to establish that the plaintiff's hus-
band had been exposed to Celotex products during the course of his
employment: a transcript of her late husband's testimony in a worker's
compensation hearing; a letter from one T.R. -Hoff, an officer of the
48. As the authors of a leading treatise wrote three years before Celotex:
Rule 56(e) requires the [nonmoving party] to set forth facts that would be admissible in
evidence at trial. Material that is inadmissible will not be considered on a motion for
summary judgment because it would not establish a genuine issue of material fact if
offered at trial and continuing the action would be useless.
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 2727, at 156 (footnotes omitted).
The authors also observed:
Turning to the requirements for affidavits used on summary judgment motions, the first
question ... is whether the information they contain (as opposed to the affidavits them-
selves) would be admissible at trial. Thus, ex parte affidavits, which are not admissible
at trial, are appropriate on a summary judgment hearing to the extent they contain
admissible information.
Because the policy of Rule 56(e) is that the judge should consider any material
that would be admissible at trial, the rules of evidence and the exceptions thereto deter-
mine what averments the affidavit may contain.
Id. § 2738, at 470-74 (footnotes omitted).
49. 477 U.S. at 324.
50. Id. at 327.
51. For criticism of this aspect of Celotex, see Nelken, supra note 17, at 69-77.
52. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1066 (1988).
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company that had employed the plaintiff's husband, to an insurance
agent; and a letter from the insurance agent to the plaintiff's lawyer
restating the contents of Mr. Hoff's letter."3
Celotex argued that the documents were inadmissible hearsay that
should not be considered in connection with the summary judgment
motion. Over a strong dissent, the majority held that the letter from
Mr. Hoff was sufficient to avoid summary judgment.54 Even if the let-
ter would not be admissible at trial, 5  its substance was "reducible" to
admissible evidence in the form of trial testimony, because the plaintiff,
in response to interrogatories, had listed Mr. Hoff as a trial witness.
Moreover, the majority emphasized that Celotex had failed to object to
the trial judge's consideration of the letter. 56
In light of Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex, summary judg-
ment practice in the federal courts can be described as follows. 57 When
the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion at trial, the movant
has two options in meeting his initial burden under Rule 56. First, he
may produce affirmative, admissible evidence58 to negate an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim. Second, the movant may
"point out" to the trial court, after reasonable time for discovery, that
53. Id. at 35.
54. The court held that the transcript of the worker's compensation hearing was not admis-
sible under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1), which provides an exception to the hearsay rule for testimony
in a prior proceeding if the declarant is unavailable and the opposing party had opportunity and
motive to develop the testimony. Similarly, the insurance agent's letter was to no avail. Because it
merely restated the substance of Mr. Hoff's letter, it offered "no independent evidence of a genu-
ine issue of material fact." Id. at 39 n.13.
55. The letter was arguably admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay
rule, see FED. R. EvID. 803(6), but the court did not resolve the issue. 826 F.2d at 37.
56. Id. at 37-38. In dissent, Judge Bork argued that Mr. Hoff's letter and the plaintiff's
intent to call him as a witness at trial were insufficient to avoid summary judgment, since there
was no indication that Mr. Hoff had personal knowledge of any asbestos exposure. Thus, it was
possible that the content of Mr. Hoff's anticipated trial testimony could be inadmissible. Judge
Bork also contended that the letter itself was inadmissible and therefore could not be considered
by the trial judge in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Moreover, he disputed the major-
ity's claim that Celotex had failed to object to the trial court's consideration of the letter. Id. at
41-42 (Bork, J., dissenting).
57. The procedural aspects of this summary are taken largely from Justice Brennan's Celo-
tex dissent, in which he elaborated upon the framework set forth by the majority while disagree-
ing with its application. 477 U.S. at 330-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Nelken, supra note
17, at 81-84; Schwarzer et al., supra note 17, at 477-83; Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary
Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact of the Celotex Trilogy, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 35-36
(1990).
58. In Celotex, the Supreme Court addressed only the evidence presented by the nonmoving
party. Nothing in the decision indicates that the Court intended to permit the movant to support
his motion with inadmissible evidence.
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there is an absence of evidence in the record to support an essential
element of that claim. If the first option is employed, the nonmoving
party may argue that the moving party's evidence is not sufficient to
meet its initial burden, counter with "reducible" evidence sufficient to
withstand a motion for directed verdict at trial, or move for a continu-
ance under Rule 56(f) to obtain more evidence. If the movant uses the
second option, the nonmoving party may attempt to demonstrate that
the moving party has not met his initial burden by showing the court
that the record does in fact contain sufficient evidence to support his
claim. As is the case if the moving party employs the first option, the
nonmoving party may also seek a continuance under Rule 56(f) or pro-
duce additional evidence, which, if reduced to admissible form at trial,
would be sufficient to withstand a directed verdict.
If both parties satisfy their respective burdens, the question be-
comes whether, on the basis of the summary judgment record, a rea-
sonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party at trial. The
moving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on this issue, and
the court must take into account the applicable standard of proof, e.g.,
preponderance of the evidence. Although weighing the evidence re-
mains impermissible, the court may consider its persuasiveness and
plausibility in deciding whether the proof is sufficient to permit a jury
verdict for the nonmoving party. The evidence and the inferences that
can be drawn therefrom are to be viewed in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.
Matters are less complex when the moving party has the burden of
persuasion at trial. In this situation, the movant must produce admissi-
ble evidence of sufficient strength that a reasonable jury could not find
in favor of the nonmoving party. This, of course, is the same standard
that must be applied when the party with the burden of persuasion
moves for a directed verdict. In response, the nonmoving party must
argue that the movant has not satisfied his initial burden, counter with
"reducible" evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or seek a
continuance under Rule 56(f). The moving party has the ultimate bur-
den of persuading the court that summary judgment is appropriate.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ARKANSAS APPROACH
In 1961, the Arkansas General Assembly adopted a summary
judgment statute that tracked Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure.59 Although the Arkansas Supreme Court described this pro-
vision as "a salutary measure, designed to prevent unnecessary trials
where the record shows that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
litigated," it stressed in the same opinion that summary judgment is an
"extraordinary remedy."'60 This attitude persists today under Rule 56
of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which superseded the
statute.6'
As Justice Newbern has aptly put it, the supreme court "looks
askance" at summary judgment.6 2 Because it considers summary judg-
ment to be an "extreme remedy,"68 the court has warned that a motion
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-211 (Repl. 1962) superseded by ARK. R. Civ, P. 56. See Richard
M. Smith, Comment, Summary Judgment - Act 123 of the General Assembly of 1961, 15 ARK.
L. REV. 388 (1961). Prior to the enactment of this provision, other statutes dating to 1857 and the
Civil Code of 1868 authorized summary judgment only in limited situations. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
29-201 to 29-210 (Repl. 1962) (current versions at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-65-201 to -202). See
Cook v. Cramer Cotton Co., 155 Ark. 549, 244 S.W. 730 (1922); Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co.
v. Kittrell, 107 Ark. 361, 155 S.W. 496 (1913); Coolby v. Lovewell, 95 Ark. 567, 130 S.W. 574
(1910). Given their restrictive nature, these statutes were considered unimportant to practitioners
and "hardly worth discussion." Panel on Comparison of Federal and Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure, 12 ARK. L. REV. 57, 64 (1957) (remarks of Judge Charles W. Light). See also H.
Clay Robinson, Comment, Has the Arkansas Supreme Court Created a Summary Judgment
Procedure?, 12 ARK. L. REV. 178 (1958) (reviewing state practice with respect to summary
disposition).
60. Kratz v. Mills, 240 Ark. 872, 879, 402 S.W.2d 661, 665 (1966). See also Woodell v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 106, 108, 616 S.W.2d 781, 782 (1981) (explaining that sum-
mary judgment is "a useful device for avoiding unnecessary trials"); Childs v. Berry, 268 Ark.
970, 973, 597 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Ct. App. 1980) (noting that summary judgment is "an appropri-
ate means of avoiding the expense and time of a formal trial").
61. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 56, reporter's note.
62. DAVID NEWBERN. ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 26-6 (1985).
63. Lovell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 310 Ark. 791, 793-94, 839 S.W.2d 222, 224
(1992); Thruston v. Little River County, 310 Ark. 188, 190, 832 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1992); Hick-
son v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 232, 828 S.W.2d 840, 841 (1992); Franklin v. OSCA, Inc., 308 Ark.
409, 414, 825 S.W.2d 812, 815 (1992); Dillard v. Resolution Trust Corp., 308 Ark. 357, 359, 824
S.W.2d 387, 388 (1992); Morris v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 25, 28, 805 S.W.2d 948, 950
(1991); Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 75, 793 S.W.2d 782, 783 (1990); Culpepper v. Smith, 302
Ark. 558, 560-61, 792 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1990); Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 547, 759
S.W.2d 20, 22 (1988); Ford v. Cunningham, 291 Ark. 56, 58, 722 S.W.2d 567, 568 (1987);
Wolner v. Bogaev, 290 Ark. 299, 302, 718 S.W.2d 942, 944 (1986); Township Builders, Inc. v.
Kraus Constr. Co., 286 Ark. 487, 490, 696 S.W.2d 308, 309 (1985); Brewington v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 285 Ark. 389, 391, 687 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1985); Leigh Winham, Inc. v.
Reynolds Ins. Agency, 279 Ark. 317, 318, 651 S.W.2d 74, 75 (1983); Lee v. Doe, 274 Ark. 467,
471, 626 S.W.2d 353, 355 (1981); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Credit, 274 Ark. 66, 68, 621
S.W.2d 855, 857 (1981); Talley v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 271, 620 S.W.2d 260,
261-62 (1981); Ollar v. Spakes, 269 Ark. 488, 494, 601 S.W.2d 868, 871 (1980); Dodrill v. Ar-
kansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 634, 590 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1076 (1980); Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 708, 567 S.W.2d 113, 115 (1978); Robinson v.
Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 258 Ark. 935, 939, 530 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1975); Purser v. Corpus Christi
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for summary judgment is to be denied if there is "any doubt
whatever.""' The purpose of such a motion, the court has emphasized,
"is not to try issues, but to determine if there are issues to be tried."
'6 5
This view of summary judgment corresponds to that of most federal
courts prior to the three 1986 cases discussed above.
Not surprisingly, the summary judgment principles set out in the
Arkansas case law also mirror those found in pre-1986 federal deci-
sions. The burden of proving that there is no dispute as to the material
facts rests with the party who moves for summary judgment.66 Evi-
State Nat'l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 57, 522 S.W.2d 187, 189 (1975); Harvey v. Shaver, 247 Ark. 92,
95, 444 S.W.2d 256, 257 (1969); Deltic Farm & Timber Co. v. Manning, 239 Ark. 264, 266, 389
S.W.2d 435, 437 (1965).
64. Baggett v. Bradley County Farmers Coop., 302 Ark. 401, 403, 789 S.W.2d 733, 735
(1990). Accord, Dwiggins v. Propst Helicopters, Inc., 310 Ark. 62, 66, 832 S.W.2d 840, 842
(1992); Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 208, 818 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1991); Wolner v. Bogaev,
290 Ark. 299, 302, 718 S.W.2d 942, 944 (1986); Rowland v. Gastroenterology Assoc., P.A., 280
Ark. 278, 280, 657 S.W.2d 536, 537 (1983); Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Highland Resources, Inc.,
265 Ark. 468, 470, 579 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1979); Hand v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 255 Ark.
802, 807, 502 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1973).
65. Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 561, 792 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1990). Accord, Thomas
v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 207-08, 818 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1991); Baggett v. Bradley County Farm-
ers Coop., 302 Ark. 401, 403, 789 S.W.2d 733, 735 (1990); Township Builders, Inc. v. Kraus
Constr. Co., 286 Ark. 487, 492, 696 S.W.2d 308, 310 (1985); Rowland v. Gastroenterology As-
soc., P.A., 280 Ark. 278, 280, 657 S.W.2d 536, 537 (1983); Collyard v. American Home Assur-
ance Co., 271 Ark. 228, 230, 607 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1980); Trace X Chem., Inc. v. Highland
Resources, Inc., 265 Ark. 468, 469, 579 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1979); Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281,
293, 445 S.W.2d 76, 82 (1969).
66. Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical Medicine Ctr., 311 Ark. 41, 45, - S.W.2d -,
- (1992); Lovell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 310 Ark. 791, 794, 839 S.W.2d 222, 224
(1992); Thruston v. Little River County, 310 Ark. 188, 190, 832 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1992); Harvi-
son v. Charles E. Davis & Assoc., Inc., 310 Ark. 104, 107, 835 S.W.2d 284, 285 (1992); Hickson
v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 233, 828 S.W.2d 840, 841 (1992); Brooks v. City of Benton, 308 Ark. 571,
574, 826 S.W.2d 259, 260 (1992); Waire v. Joseph, 308 Ark. 528, 535, 825 S.W.2d 594, 599
(1992); Morris v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 25, 28, 805 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1991); Guthrie v.
Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 76, 793 S.W.2d 782, 783 (1990); Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558, 561, 792
S.W.2d 293, 294 (1990); Cordes v. Outdoor Living Ctr., Inc., 301 Ark. 26, 30, 781 S.W.2d 31, 33
(1989); Smith v. Gray, 300 Ark. 401, 404, 779 S.W.2d 173, 175 (1989); Webb v. HCA Health
Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 619, 780 S.W.2d 571, 573 (1989); Pinkston v. Lovell, 296
Ark. 543, 548, 759 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1988); Estate of Hastings v. Planters & Stockmen Bank, 296
Ark. 409, 413, 757 S.W.2d 546, 548 (1988); Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 550, 739
S.W.2d 676, 677-78 (1987); McDonald v. Eubanks, 292 Ark. 533, 534, 731 S.W.2d 769, 770
(1987); Ford v. Cunningham, 291 Ark. 56, 58, 722 S.W.2d 567, 568 (1987); Wolner v. Bogaev,
290 Ark. 299, 301, 718 S.W.2d 942, 944 (1986); Township Builders, Inc. v. Kraus Constr. Co.,
286 Ark. 487, 490, 696 S.W.2d 308, 309 (1985); Clemens v. First Nat'l Bank, 286 Ark. 290, 293,
692 S.W.2d 222, 224 (1985); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 109, 661 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1983); Lee
v. Doe, 274 Ark. 467, 471, 626 S.W.2d 353, 356 (1981); Collyard v. American Home Assurance
Co., 271 Ark. 228, 230, 607 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1980); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265
Ark. 628, 634, 590 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Arnold v. All
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dence submitted in connection with the motion must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with any doubts and in-
ferences resolved against the movant. 17 Even if the facts are undis-
puted, summary judgment is not proper if the evidence "reveals aspects
from which inconsistent hypotheses might reasonably be drawn."6 The
American Assurance Co., 255 Ark. 275, 279, 499 S.W.2d 861, 864 (1973); Borden, Inc., v. Worn-
mack, 253 Ark. 1067, 1070, 490 S.W.2d 781, 783 (1973); Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248
Ark. 1194, 1204, 456 S.W.2d 673, 679 (1970); Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 523, 446
S.W.2d 543, 545 (1969); Harvey v. Shaver, 247 Ark. 92, 95, 444 S.W.2d 256, 257 (1969); Evers
v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 244 Ark. 925, 926, 428 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1968); Widmer v. Modern Ford
Tractor Sales, 244 Ark. 696, 702, 426 S.W.2d 806, 809 (1968); United Press Int'l, Inc. v. Hem-
reich, 241 Ark. 36, 39-40, 406 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1966); Deltic Farm & Timber Co. v. Manning,
239 Ark. 264, 266, 389 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1965).
67. Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical Medicine Ctr., 311 Ark. 41, 45, -. S.W.2d __
- (1992); Lovell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 310 Ark. 791, 794, 839 S.W.2d 222, 224
(1992); Harvison v. Charles E. Davis & Assoc., Inc., 310 Ark. 104, 107, 835 S.W.2d 284, 285
(1992); Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375, 378, 830 S.W.2d 861, 862-63 (1992); Hickson v. Saig,
309 Ark. 231, 233, 828 S.W.2d 840, 841 (1992); Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 205, 818
S.W.2d 940, 941 (1991); Carmichael v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 549, 553, 810 S.W.2d
39, 42 (1991); Morris v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 25, 28, 805 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1991);
Diebold v. Vanderstek, 304 Ark. 78, 79, 799 S.W.2d 804, 805 (1990); Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark.
74, 76, 793 S.W.2d 782, 561, 792 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1990); Culpepper v. Smith, 302 Ark. 558,
561, 792 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1990); Smith v. Gray, 300 Ark. 401, 404, 779 S.W.2d 173, 175
(1989); Pinkston v. Lovell, 296 Ark. 543, 548, 759 S.W.2d 20, 22 (1988); Ford v. Cunningham,
291 Ark. 56, 58, 722 S.W.2d 567, 568 (1987); McKay v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 289 Ark. 467, 469,
711 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1986); Township Builders, Inc. v. Kraus Constr. Co., 286 Ark. 487, 490,
696 S.W.2d 308, 309 (1985); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 108, 661 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1983);
Rowland v. Gastroenterology Assoc., P.A., 280 Ark. 278, 280, 657 S.W.2d 536, 537 (1983);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Credit, 274 Ark. 66, 68, 621 S.W.2d 855, 857 (1981); Talley v.
MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 271, 620 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1981); Cummings v. Beardsley,
271 Ark. 596, 600, 609 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1980); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628,
634, 590 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Robinson v. Rebsamen
Ford, Inc., 258 Ark. 935, 939, 530 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1975); Hand v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.,
255 Ark. 802, 807, 502 S.W.2d 474, 478 (1973); Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark. 147, 154,
464 S.W.2d 557, 561 (1971); Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 1204, 456 S.W.2d
673, 679 (1970); Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 523, 446 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1969); Harvey
v. Shaver, 247 Ark. 92, 95, 444 S.W.2d 256, 258 (1969); Bull v. Manning, 245 Ark. 552, 553-54,
433 S.W.2d 145, 146 (1968); Bergetz v. Repka, 244 Ark. 60, 61, 424 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1968);
Deam v. O.L. Puryear & Sons, Inc., 244 Ark. 18, 21, 423 S.W.2d 554, 556 (1968); Akridge v.
Park Bowling Ctr., Inc., 240 Ark. 538, 540, 401 S.W.2d 204, 205 (1966); Griffin v. Monsanto
Co., 240 Ark. 420, 422, 400 S.W.2d 492, 494 (1966); Deltic Farm & Timber Co. v. Manning,
239 Ark. 264, 265, 389 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1965); Van Dalsen v. Inman, 238 Ark. 237, 240, 379
S.W.2d 261, 263 (1964); Wirges v. Hawkins, 238 Ark. 100, 103, 378 S.W.2d 646, 648 (1964);
Russell v. City of Rogers, 236 Ark. 713, 714, 368 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1963).
68. Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203, 208, 818 S.W.2d 940, 943 (1991). Accord, Franklin
v. OSCA, Inc., 308 Ark. 409, 414, 825 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (1992); Webb v. HCA Health Servs.
of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 619, 780 S.W.2d 571, 573 (1989); Prater v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 293
Ark. 547, 550, 739 S.W.2d 676, 678 (1987); Wolner v. Bogaev, 290 Ark. 299, 302, 718 S.W.2d
942, 944 (1986); Clemens v. First Nat'l Bank, 286 Ark. 290, 293, 692 S.W.2d 222, 224 (1985);
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trial court cannot weigh the evidence in deciding a summary judgment
motion, 69 and cases presenting issues of intent are "particularly inap-
propriate" for summary judgment. 0
As an initial matter, the moving party must make a prima facie
showing of entitlement to summary judgment by offering proof on a
controverted issue; if he fails to do so, the motion for summary judg-
ment must be denied.71 However, once the movant has satisfied this
requirement, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must "dis-
card the shielding cloak of formal allegations and meet proof with
proof by showing a genuine issue as to a material fact."72 The nonmov-
ing party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings" but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."17 3 If the nonmoving party cannot produce such
Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 108-09, 661 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1983); Leigh Winham, Inc. v. Reyn-
olds Ins. Agency, 279 Ark. 317, 321, 651 S.W.2d 74, 75 (1983); Lee v. Doe, 274 Ark. 467, 473,
626 S.W.2d 353, 356 (1981); Saunders v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 266 Ark. 247, 249, 583
S.W.2d 58, 59 (1979); Braswell v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 708-09, 567 S.W.2d 113, 115 (1978);
Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 258 Ark. 935, 939, 530 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1975); Arnold v. All
American Assurance Co., 255 Ark. 275, 279, 499 S.W.2d 861, 864 (1973); Harvey v. Shaver, 247
Ark. 92, 95, 444 S.W.2d 256, 257 (1969); Deltic Farm & Timber Co. v. Manning, 239 Ark., 264,
266, 389 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1965).
69. Beam v. John Deere Co., 240 Ark. 107, 109, 398 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1966).
70. Ferguson v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 35 Ark. App. 100, 104, 814 S.W.2d
267, 269 (1991); Camp v. Elmore, 271 Ark. 407, 408-09, 609 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Ct. App. 1980). See
also Morris v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 25, 30-31, 805 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (1991).
71. Collyard v. American Home Assurance Co., 271 Ark. 228, 229, 607 S.W.2d 666, 668
(1980); Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark. 147, 154-55, 464 S.W.2d 557, 561 (1971); United
Pess Int'l, Inc. v. Hernreich, 241 Ark. 36, 40, 406 S.W.2d 317, 319 (1966); Muddiman v. Wall,
33 Ark. App. 175, 178, 803 S.W.2d 945, 947 (1991).
72. Hughes Western World, Inc. v. Westmoor Mfg. Co., 269 Ark. 300, 301, 601 S.W.2d
826, 826-27 (1980). Accord, Sanders v. Banks 309 Ark. 375, 378, 830 S.W.2d 861, 864 (1992);
Dillard v. Resolution Trust Corp., 308 Ark. 357, 359, 824 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1992); Carmichael v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 549, 553, 810 S.W.2d 39, 41-42 (1991); Harrell v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 305 Ark. 490, 491-92, 808 S.W.2d 779, 780 (1991); Reagan v. City of Piggott,
305 Ark. 77, 81, 805 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1991); Anderson v.'First Nat'l Bank, 304 Ark. 164, 166,
801 S.W.2d 273, 274-75 (1990); Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 78, 793 S.W.2d 782, 784 (1990);
McDonald v. Eubanks, 292 Ark. 533, 535, 731 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1987); Williams v. Joyner-
Cranford-Burke Constr. Co., 285 Ark. 134, 137, 685 S.W.2d 503, 505 (1985); Richerson v.
Bearden, 278 Ark. 350, 352, 645 S.W.2d 946, 947 (1983); Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 275 Ark.
421, 423, 631 S.W.2d 5, 6 (1982); Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 371, 631 S.W.2d 263, 264
(1982); Cummings v. Beardsley, 271 Ark. 596, 600, 609 S.W.2d 66, 69 (1980); Miskimins v. City
Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 1204-05, 456 S.W.2d 673, 679 (1970); Coffelt v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 248 Ark. 313, 316, 451 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1970); Deam v. O.L. Puryear & Sons, Inc.,
244 Ark. 18, 21, 423 S.W.2d 554, 556 (1968); Mid-South Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 241 Ark.
935, 939, 410 S.W.2d 873, 875 (1967).
73. ARK. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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evidence, summary judgment is obviously proper; for example, in a re-
cent case the supreme court affirmed a summary judgment where the
nonmoving party "offered nothing" in response to the motion.
However, the quantum of evidence that the nonmoving party must
produce does not appear to be particularly great, since a summary
judgment motion must be denied if there is "any doubt whatever. '75
Thus, the nonmoving party's burden does not, in practice, appear to be
a heavy one. According to the supreme court, "[a]ll that [is] required
of the [nonmoving party] to avoid the entry of summary judgment
against him [is] to show that there [is] a justiciable issue .... -7" As
discussed below, it appears that summary judgment is improper so long
as the nonmoving party offers some evidence, even a mere scintilla, in
opposition to the motion. 7 Moreover, the nonmoving party need not
"establish [his] case by a preponderance of the evidence or by any
other standard of proof," but must only "establish that there was a
genuine issue for trial.1
78
Both the moving party and his opponent must produce admissible
evidence in support of their respective positions. For example, in Or-
ganized Security Life Insurance Co. v. Munyon 9 the supreme court
held that the moving party's affidavit was deficient because it did not
indicate that the stated facts were within the affiant's personal knowl-
edge. 80 By way of comparison, the court concluded in Dixie Insurance
74. Dixie Ins. Co. v. Joe Works Chevrolet, Inc., 298 Ark. 106, 111,766 S.W.2d 4, 7 (1989).
See also Harvison v. Charles E. Davis & Assoc. Inc., 310 Ark. 104, 110, 835 S.W.2d 284, 287
(1992); Dillard v. Resolution Trust Corp., 308 Ark. 357, 359-60, 824 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1992);
Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 78, 793 S.W.2d 782, 784 (1990); Lee v. Westark Inv. Co., 253
Ark. 267, 271, 485 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (1972). Cf. Franklin v. OSCA, Inc., 308 Ark. 409, 412,
825 S.W.2d 812, 814 (1992) (nonmoving party satisfied "specific facts" requirement by submit-
ting thirteen depositions in opposition to motion for summary judgment).
75. See cases cited supra note 64.
76. Lee v. Westark Inv. Co., 253 Ark. 267, 271, 485 S.W.2d 712, 715 (1972).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 98-110.
78. Chick v. Rebsamen Ins., 8 Ark. App. 157, 159-60, 649 S.W.2d 196, 197 (1983). In this
case, the nonmoving party apparently did not have the burden of proof at trial. The plaintiff
insurance company brought suit against defendants on an alleged open account, claiming nearly
$15,000 for premiums due on insurance policies. On plaintiff's motion, the trial court granted
summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that defendants' responsive affida-
vits were sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 159, 649 S.W.2d at 197.
79. 247 Ark. 449, 446 S.W.2d 233 (1969).
80. Id. at 456, 446 S.W.2d at 237. The court stated:
It must be affirmatively shown, or appear from statements contained in any affidavit
supporting or opposing a summary judgment, that it is based upon personal knowledge
of the affiant, that the facts stated therein would be admissible in evidence and that the
affiant is a witness competent to state these facts in evidence.
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Co. v. Joe Works Chevrolet, Inc.81 that the trial court properly consid-
ered the moving party's affidavits, which contained statements that
were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.8" The court
also made plain in that case that once the moving party has satisfied
his initial burden, the nonmoving party "must respond showing facts
which would be admissible in evidence to create a factual issue.""3 Be-
cause the nonmoving party had not done so, summary judgment was
proper. 84
III. POST-CELOTEX DEVELOPMENTS IN ARKANSAS
In the six years since Celotex and its companion cases, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has continued to describe summary judgment as an
"extreme remedy." 80 Indeed, the court has recently suggested that
Id. See also Brewington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 285 Ark. 389, 392, 687 S.W.2d 838,
840 (1985) (explaining that moving party's affidavit must state facts that would be admissible in
evidence).
81. 298 Ark. 106, 766 S.W.2d 4 (1989).
82. Id. at 109-11, 766 S.W.2d at 6.
83. Id. at 11I, 766 S.W.2d at 7 (citing DAVID NEWBERN, ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 26-6, at 255). Accord, Diebold v. Vanderstek, 304 Ark. 78, 80, 799 S.W.2d 804,
805 (1990); Turner v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 275 Ark. 424, 427, 631 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1982);
Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 1205, 456 S.W.2d 673, 679 (1970). See also Brew-
ington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 285 Ark. 389, 392, 687 S.W.2d 838, 840 (1985) (trial
court properly disregarded nonmoving party's affidavit, which was "generally hearsay"); Pruitt v.
Cargill, Inc., 284 Ark. 474, 477, 683 S.W.2d 906, 908 (1985) (assertion in affidavit of plaintiff,
the nonmoving party, that he "thought" he was buying a water tank from defendant, was not
sufficient); Hughes Western World, Inc., v. Westmoor Mfg. Co., 269 Ark. 300, 301-02, 601
S.W.2d 826, 827 (1980) (nonmoving party's affidavit, with qualification "as Affiant understands
it," was insufficient, since it did not assert the required personal knowledge).
84. 298 Ark. at 111, 766 S.W.2d at 7. It should also be noted that affidavits consisting of
general denials, without statements of specific facts, are insufficient to counter a properly sup-
ported summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark.
549, 553-54, 810 S.W.2d 39, 42 (1991); Williams v. Joyner-Cranford-Burke Constr. Co., 285
Ark. 134, 137, 685 S.W.2d 503, 505 (1985); Turner v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 275 Ark. 424, 427,
631 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1982). By the same token, an affidavit containing denials and conclusory
allegations is not sufficient to support a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., McDonald v. Eu-
banks, 292 Ark. 533, 535-36, 731 S.W.2d 769, 770-71 (1987); Brewington v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 285 Ark. 389, 392, 687 S.W.2d 838, 840 (1985); Hood v. Arkansas School Bd.
Ins. Coop., 35 Ark. App. 1, 5-6, 811 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1991). In light of ARK. R. CIV. P. 56(c), the
trial court may consider only pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and
affidavits, if any, in ruling on a summary judgment motion and may not take into account matters
raised for the first time in briefs or exhibits thereto. Eldridge v. Board of Correction, 298 Ark.
467, 469, 768 S.W.2d 534, 535 (1989). See also Godwin v. Churchman, 305 Ark. 520, 524, 810
S.W.2d 34, 36 (1991); Carter v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 287 Ark. 39, 42, 696 S.W.2d 318, 319-20
(1985); Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 285 Ark. 95, 96, 685 S.W.2d 164, 165 (1985).
85. E.g., Thruston v. Little River County, 310 Ark. 188, 190, 832 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1992);
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summary judgment is improper even if the same evidence, when
presented at trial, would result in a directed verdict for the nonmoving
party. On the other hand, the court has cited Anderson approvingly
with respect to the standard of proof issue and has approved use of the
Celotex "pointing out" method by which the moving party may satisfy
his initial burden. While these are welcome developments, other cases
indicate that the court has stopped considerably short of adopting the
federal approach to summary judgment.
A. The Directed Verdict Analogy
As early as 1963, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that
"the theory underlying a motion for summary judgment is the same as
that underlying a motion for a directed verdict.""' In that case, as well
as in subsequent decisions, the court suggested that the similarity lies
in the fact that evidence submitted with either motion "must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, with all
doubts and inferences being resolved against the moving party."8 7 At
least one case indicates that the similarity extends further, in that a
motion for summary judgment, like a motion for directed verdict,
should be entered "only if the proof ... presents no issue for the jury..
. ."8" It now seems clear, however, that the standards for passing on the
two motions are not identical.
Nearly sixty years ago, the supreme court described the rule per-
taining to motions for directed verdict as follows:
It is a rule of universal application that, where the testimony is undis-
puted and from it all reasonable minds must draw the same conclu-
sion of fact, it is the duty of the court to declare as a matter of law
the conclusion to be reached; but, where there is any substantial evi-
Hickson v. Saig, 309 Ark. 231, 232, 828 S.W.2d 840, 841 (1992); Franklin v. OSCA, Inc., 308
Ark. 409, 414, 825 S.W.2d 812, 815 (1992); Dillard v. Resolution Trust Corp., 308 Ark. 357,
359, 824 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1992). See also cases cited supra note 63.
86. Russell v. City of Rogers, 236 Ark. 713, 714, 368 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1963).. Accord, Deltic
Farm & Timber Co., v. Manning, 239 Ark. 264, 267, 389 S.W.2d 435, 438 (1965); Woodell v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 106, 109, 616 S.W.2d 781, 782-83 (.1980).
87. Russell v. City of Rogers, 236 Ark. at 714, 368 S.W.2d at 90. Accord, Bull v. Manning,
245 Ark. 552, 553-54, 433 S.W.2d 145, 146 (1968); Bergetz v. Repka, 244 Ark. 60, 61, 424
S.W.2d 367, 368 (1968); Deam v. O.L. Puryear & Sons, Inc., 244 Ark. 18, 21, 423 S.W.2d 554,
556 (1968); Akridge v. Park Bowling Ctr. Inc., 240 Ark. 538, 540, 401 S.W.2d 204, 205 (1966);
Van Dalsen v. Inman, 238 Ark. 237, 240, 379 S.W.2d 261, 263-64 (1964); Woodell v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 106, 109, 616 S.W.2d 781, 783 (1981).
88. Bergetz v. Repka, 244 Ark. 60, 61, 424 S.W.2d 367, 368 (1968).
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dence to support the verdict, the question must be submitted to the
jury. In testing whether or not there is any substantial evidence in a
given case, the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible there-
from should be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the verdict is directed, and, if there is any conflict in the evi-
dence, or where the evidence is not in dispute but is in such a state
that fair-minded men might draw different conclusions therefrom, it is
error to direct a verdict.89
This standard, commonly known as the "substantial evidence rule," is
expressed in varying language in numerous cases decided both before
and after adoption of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.90
From time to time, the supreme court has employed virtually the
same standard in summary judgment cases, holding that summary
judgment is not proper if reasonable persons could differ from the evi-
dence or the inferences drawn therefrom.91 In fact, the court has on
occasion used the words "substantial evidence" in connection with a
motion for summary judgment. For example, in Arnold v. All Ameri-
can Assurance Co.,92 the court said that when the moving party has the
burden of persuasion at trial, the question is whether a reasonable fact-
89. Smith v. McEachin, 186 Ark. 1132, 1134, 57 S.W.2d 1043, 1044 (1933). See generally
Robert C. Banks, Jr., Comment, Arkansas Standards for Testing the Sufficiency of the Evidence,
25 ARK. L. REV. 288, 293-300 (1971) (discussing state practice with respect to motions for di-
rected verdict).
90. E.g., Dorton v. Francisco, 309 Ark. 472, 476, 833 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1992); Arkansas
Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Davis, 304 Ark. 70, 73, 800 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1990); Carton v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 303 Ark. 568, 572, 798 S.W.2d 674, 676 (1990); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Porterfield, 287 Ark. 27, 29, 695 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1985); Kinco, Inc. v. Schueck Steel,
Inc., 283 Ark. 72, 76, 671 S.W.2d 178, 180-81 (1984); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henley, 275
Ark. 122, 125, 628 S.W.2d 301, 303 (1982); Williams v. Curtis, 256 Ark. 237, 244-45, 506
S.W.2d 563, 567-68 (1974); Phillips Coop. Gin Co. v. Toll, 228 Ark. 891, 893, 311 S.W.2d 171,
172 (1958). An appellate court employs the same standard in reviewing a ruling on a motion for
directed verdict. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kelton, 305 Ark. 173, 176, 806 S.W.2d 373, 375
(1991); Howard v. Hicks, 304 Ark. 112, 113, 800 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1990); Grendell v. Kiehl, 291
Ark. 228, 229, 723 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1987); Ikani v. Bennett, 284 Ark. 409, 410, 682 S.W.2d
747, 748 (1985).
91. E.g., Diebold v. Vanderstek, 304 Ark. 78, 79, 799 S.W.2d 804, 805 (1990); Webb v.
HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 300 Ark. 613, 619, 780 S.W.2d 571, 573 (1989); Prater v.
St. Paul Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 547, 550, 739 S.W.2d 676, 678 (1987); McKay v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
289 Ark. 467, 469, 711 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1986); Clemens v. First Nat'l Bank, 286 Ark. 290, 293,
692 S.W.2d 222, 224 (1985); Lee v. Doe, 274 Ark. 467, 473, 626 S.W.2d 353, 356 (1981); Bras-
well v. Gehl, 263 Ark. 706, 708-09, 567 S.W.2d 113, 115 (1978); Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford,
Inc., 258 Ark. 935, 939, 530 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1975); Harvey v. Shaver, 247 Ark. 92, 95, 444
S.W.2d 256, 257 (1969); Deltic Farm & Timber Co. v. Manning, 239 Ark. 264, 266, 389 S.W.2d
435, 437 (1965).
92. 255 Ark. 275, 499 S.W.2d 861 (1973).
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finder "could draw only one conclusion" from the facts; if there is "any
substantial evidence on which a contrary result could be reached, the
[summary] judgment should be denied." 93 Under these circumstances,
a directed verdict for the party with the burden of persuasion is also
improper.9'
More recently, the court has indicated that summary judgment is
a different animal. In Sanders v. Banks,95 for instance, the court af-
firmed a summary judgment for the defendants in a slip-and-fall case.
The defendants, in support of their motion, produced evidence that
none of their employees had seen a foreign substance on the floor the
day of the accident. For her part, the plaintiff "could only speculate"
as to the nature of the substance that allegedly caused her fall and
"had no idea" how the substance came to be on the floor. "Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]," the court said,
''we cannot say there was any evidence whatever as to how the foreign
matter came to be present or that [the defendants'] personnel had any
knowledge of its presence." 96 This statement suggests that the court
would have reversed the summary judgment had the plaintiff been able
to come up with "any evidence whatever" in support of her claim. Had
the Sanders case involved a motion for directed verdict rather than one
for summary judgment, the issue would have been whether there was
substantial evidence; "any evidence" would clearly not have been
sufficient.97
The difference between the two motions is highlighted in Thomas
93. Id. at 279, 499 S.W.2d at 864. See also Lee v. Doe, 274 Ark. 467, 471, 626 S.W.2d
353, 355 (1981); Akridge v. Park Bowling Ctr., Inc., 240 Ark. 538, 540, 401 S.W.2d 204, 205
(1966).
94. E.g., Swafford Ice Cream Co. v. Sealtest Foods Div., 252 Ark. 1183, 1193, 483 S.W.2d
202, 209 (1972); Beard v. Coggins, 249 Ark. 518, 522-23, 459 S.W.2d 791, 793 (1970); Spink v.
Mourton, 235 Ark. 919, 922, 362 S.W.2d 665, 667 (1962); Woodmen of the World Life Ins.
Soc'y v. Reese, 206 Ark. 530, 537, 176 S.W.2d 708, 712 (1943). As the court observed in Spink,
a directed verdict for the party with the burden of persuasion is a "rarity." 235 Ark. at 922, 362
S.W.2d at 667.
95. 309 Ark. 375, 830 S.W.2d 861 (1992).
96. Id. at 379, 830 S.W.2d at 863. As a matter of substantive law, the plaintiff could also
have prevailed by showing that the substance had been on the floor of the premises for such a
length of time that the defendants knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and
failed to use ordinary care to remove it. With respect to this issue, the court held that there was
"no evidence that the substance which was allegedly on the floor had been there long enough that
store personnel should have had notice of it." Id. at 380, 830 S.W.2d at 864.
97. See also Howard v. Hicks, 304 Ark. 112, 113, 800 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1990) (emphasiz-
ing that case "involves a directed verdict and not a summary judgment").
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v. Sessions,98 a wrongful death case based on claims of medical mal-
practice. Suit was brought by the administrator of the decedent's estate
against two physicians (Drs. Sessions and Bell) and a hospital, alleging
that the doctors had misdiagnosed the decedent's heart attack as symp-
toms related to alcohol abuse and had declined to admit him to the
hospital. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Bell and the hospital, and the jury subsequently returned a defendant's
verdict for Dr. Sessions. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed with
respect to the hospital but otherwise reversed and remanded.
For present purposes, our concern is the portion of the court's
opinion dealing with the summary judgment entered on the claim
against Dr. Bell, who had not been present at the hospital when the
decedent arrived. Dr. Bell contended that his involvement had been
limited to a single telephone conversation with Dr. Sessions, who ex-
amined the decedent at the emergency room but who had no authority
to admit patients. During the phone call, Dr. Bell said, he agreed to
admit the decedent for detoxification. Dr. Sessions and an emergency
room nurse confirmed that Dr. Bell had authorized admission and
stated that the decedent had refused and left the hospital against medi-
cal advice. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court granted Dr.
Bell's motion for summary judgment."9
The supreme court reversed, pointing out that the trial court had
improperly "presume[d] the credibility of interested parties and
focuse[d] on the proof of the movant while disregarding opposing proof,
exactly the reverse of how the proof should be weighed in deciding a
motion for summary judgment." 100 The court added:
Some courts apply the "scintilla of evidence" rule which requires
a court considering summary judgment to admit the truthfulness of
all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, thereby removing all issues
of credibility from the case, and determine if there are any facts from
which a jury could reasonably infer ultimate facts upon which a claim
depends; if so, the case must be decided by the factfinder. Schoen v.
Gulledge, 481 So.2d 1094 (S.Ct. Ala. 1985). Our own rule is similar:
The object of summary judgment proceedings is not to try the issues,
but to determine if there are any issues to be tried, and if there is any
doubt whatsoever, the motion should be denied.101
98. 307 Ark. 203, 818 S.W.2d 940 (1991).
99. Id. at 206-07, 818 S.W.2d at 941-42.
100. Id. at 207, 818 S.W.2d at 942.
101. Id. at 207-08, 818 S.W.2d at 942 (quotation omitted).
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It seems clear that summary judgment was improper in this case.
As the court pointed out, the evidence that the decedent refused an
offer of admission to the hospital came from interested witnesses.
While the nonmoving party may not simply argue that the jury should
be allowed to "consider the credibility of a witness whose testimony is
uncontroverted,"' 1 2 summary judgment is inappropriate if the nonmov-
ing party can show some reason why the witness might be disbelieved
at trial, as would be the case when he has a financial interest in the
outcome of the case.10 8 Moreover, there was other evidence that cast
doubt on the assertion that the decedent had been offered admission to
the hospital. For example, hospital records were silent on the matter,
though they mentioned that he had refused a transfer to a detoxifica-
tion facility in Little Rock. 0 4 In addition, the decedent's neighbor, who
had driven him to the hospital, testified that she was told by emergency
room personnel to take him home because "there was nothing the hos-
pital could do for him. 10 5
While the court reached the correct result, its apparent approval
of the scintilla rule is troubling. For support, the court relied on Schoen
v. Gulledge,"" an Alabama case decided two years before that state
abolished the scintilla rule in favor of the more widely accepted sub-
stantial evidence standard.10 7 Although Schoen does not actually use
the term "scintilla," it cites an earlier decision, Ryan v. Charles Town-
send Ford, Inc.,108 that clearly sets forth the former Alabama ap-
proach: "It is a long-established rule in this state that on motions for
102. Carmichael v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 549, 553, 810 S.W.2d 39, 42
(1991). See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir.
1983) (neither desire to cross-examine affiant nor unspecified hope of undermining his credibility
will suffice to avoid summary judgment); Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1204, 1213 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mere hope that fact finder will disbelieve affiant is not sufficient).
103. See Cameron v. Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Co., 824 F.2d 570, 575 (7th Cir.
1987); Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401, 408 (8th Cir. 1966); Evans v. Fort Worth Star Tele-
gram, 548 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Louis, supra note 25, 83 YALE L.J. at 749.
104. 307 Ark. at 208, 818 S.W.2d at 943. On deposition, a doctor testifying on the plain-
tiff's behalf described the emergency room records as "grossly incomplete" and opined that they
"belie the contention that [the decedent] was offered admission .. " Id. at 209, 818 S.W.2d at
943. The supreme court held that the trial judge erred in excluding this testimony. Id. at 209-10,
818 S.W.2d at 943-44.
105. Id. at 208, 818 S.W.2d at 943.
106. 481 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. 1985).
107. See John J. Coleman III, Summary Judgment in Alabama; The Nuances of Practice
Under Rule 56, 20 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1989). Other states apparently continue to follow the
scintilla rule. See, e.g., Yamamoto et al., supra note 57, at 9-10 (discussing Hawaii practice).
108. 409 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1981).
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summary judgment, the movant has the burden of negating the exis-
tence of any issue of material fact, and if there is a scintilla of evidence
supporting the non-moving party, summary judgment is inappropri-
ate."10 9 As one commentator observed, this rule "led to a reluctance to
grant [summary judgment] in all but the most obvious cases." 10
A scintilla of evidence is not very much; as the Alabama Supreme
Court observed in a 1976 case, it is "a mere gleam, glimmer, spark, the
least bit, [or] the smallest trace" of evidence.1 ' In Ryan, the scintilla
was in the form of testimony from the plaintiff, the nonmoving party.
The issue was whether her action for fraud had been brought within
one year of its discovery, as required by the statute of limitations. Not
surprisingly, the plaintiff testified that she had discovered the fraud less
than a year before the suit was filed, thus making the action timely.
This testimony, the court said, was sufficient to avoid the defendant's
motion for summary judgment." 2 Similarly, the court held in Schoen
that the plaintiffs' own testimony as to when they discovered the al-
leged fraud was adequate to create a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to the statute of limitations question."'
The Arkansas Supreme Court has soundly rejected the scintilla
rule in the directed verdict context. As early as 1893, the court ob-
served that "the scintilla doctrine has never prevailed in this State" and
held that a directed verdict is proper if "the evidence is not legally
sufficient to sustain a verdict.""' A few years later, the court referred
to the "settled rule" that a directed verdict is justified when "it is plain
that the plaintiff has not made out a case sufficient in law to entitle him
to recover."" 5 Put another way, there must be "substantial evidence
109. Id. at 786 (citations omitted).
110. Coleman, supra note 107, at 9.
111. Wilson v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 617, 620 (Ala. 1976).
112. 409 So. 2d at 786-87.
113. 481 So. 2d at 1097 (citing Ryan). For a similar Arkansas case, see Hickson v. Saig,
309 Ark. 231, 828 S.W.2d 840 (1992).
114. Catlett v. Railway Co., 57 Ark. 461, 467-68, 21 S.W. 1062, 1063 (1893). See also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 188 Ark. 516, 520, 67 S.W.2d 602, 604 (1934) ("[T]his
court has not adopted the scintilla of evidence rule, but it has adopted the rule that, if there is any
substantial evidence to support the verdict, it will be permitted to stand."); Henry Wrape Co. v.
Cox, 122 Ark. 445, 450, 183 S.W. 955, 957 (1916) ("We have never adopted the scintilla rule in
this State, but have uniformly held that there must be some evidence of a substantial character to
uphold a verdict of the jury."); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fuqua, 114 Ark. 112, 120, 169
S.W. 786, 788 (1914) ("We have not adopted the rule that a scintilla of evidence is sufficient to
support a verdict .... ").
115. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Britton, 107 Ark. 158, 170, 154 S.W. 215, 219 (1913).
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* . .about which fair-minded men might differ, and not a mere scin-
tilla."'116 On the other hand, "[i]f there is any substantial evidence it is
the duty of the court to submit the matter to the jury."'17
The court has defined the term "substantial evidence" as follows:
"Any" evidence is not substantial evidence. . . "Substantial evi-
dence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspi-
cion of the existence of the fact to be established. It means such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion....
"Substantial evidence . . . is of sufficient force and character that
it will, with reasonable and material certainty and precision, compel a
conclusion one way or the other. It must force or induce the mind to
pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture ... [and furnish] a substantial
basis of fact from which the fact in issue can reasonably be inferred;
and the test is not satisfied by evidence which merely creates a suspi-
cion or which amounts to no more than a scintilla or which gives
equal support to inconsistent inferences. 118
116. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Skipper, 174 Ark. 1083, 1103, 298 S.W. 849, 857 (1927),
cert. denied, 276 U.S. 629 (1928). See also Baldwin v. Wingfield, 191 Ark. 129, 136, 85 S.W.2d
689, 692 (1935) ("When there is a total defect of evidence as to any essential fact, or a spark, a
'scintilla,' as it is termed, the case should be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury.");
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Remel, 185 Ark. 598, 607, 48 S.W.2d 548, 551, cert. denied, 287 U.S.
634 (1932) ("if there is substantial evidence, it is then a question for the jury," and that a verdict
will not be sustained "where there is only a scintilla of evidence").
117. Adams v. Browning, 195 Ark. 1040, 1043, 115 S.W.2d 868, 869 (1938). Accord, Cat-
lett v. Steward, 304 Ark. 637, 639, 804 S.W.2d 699, 701 (1991); Medi-Stat, Inc. v. Kusturin, 303
Ark. 45, 53-C, 798 S.W.2d 438, 439 (1990); Bartels v. Waire, 289 Ark. 362, 364, 712 S.W.2d
285, 286 (1986); Pitts v. Greene, 238 Ark. 438, 441, 382 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1964); Humphries v.
Kendall, 195 Ark. 45, 58-59, 111 S.W.2d 492, 499 (1937); Smith v. McEachin, 186 Ark. 1132,
1134, 57 S.W.2d 1043, 1044 (1933); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Holt, 186 Ark. 672, 677, 55
S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (1932); Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Connelly, 185 Ark. 693, 694, 49
S.W.2d 387, 387 (1932). But see Texarkana Housing Auth. v. E.W. Johnson Constr. Co., 264
Ark. 523, 531, 573 S.W.2d 316, 321 (1978) (directed verdict for defendant is proper only when
there is no evidence "tending to establish" an issue in the plaintiff's favor); Pugh v. Camp, 213
Ark. 282, 283, 210 S.W.2d 120, 120 (1948) (same).
118. Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. Case, 266 Ark. 323, 330-31, 584 S.W.2d 21, 25 (1979)
(quotations and citations omitted). Although Pickens-Bond was an appeal from a decision of the
Workers' Compensation Commission, this definition of substantial evidence has been employed in
cases involving rulings on motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
E.g., Dorton v. Francisco, 309 Ark. 472, 476, 833 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1992); Carton v. Missouri
Pacific R.R. Co., 303 Ark. 568, 572, 798 S.W.2d 674, 676 (1990); Bartels v. Waire, 289 Ark.
362, 364, 712 S.W.2d 285, 286 (1986); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Porterfield, 287 Ark. 27,
29, 695 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1985); Kroger Co. v. Standard, 283 Ark. 44, 47-48, 670 S.W.2d 803,
805 (1984); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henley, 275 Ark. 122, 125, 628 S.W.2d 301, 303
(1982). The rule applies in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Surridge v. State, 279 Ark. 183, 650
S.W.2d 561 (1983) (review of sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases); Fouch v. State Alcoholic
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On occasion, of course, there is a "twilight zone where a scintilla
of evidence meets substantial evidence, and where they sometimes
blend," in which case "jurors and judges alike find a realm of uncer-
tainty." 19 Despite any such difficulties in line-drawing, the court has
clearly held that a "mere scintilla" of evidence is not sufficient to with-
stand a motion for directed verdict. Yet in the Thomas case, the court
seemed to embrace the scintilla rule with respect to summary judg-
ment. Consequently, it is possible that a plaintiff will survive a defense
motion for summary judgment only to suffer a directed verdict at trial
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Such a result makes little
sense, particularly in light of the desirability of disposing of meritless
claims prior to trial and wisely allocating judicial resources.120
As noted previously, the Anderson case makes clear that, in the
federal courts, the test for evaluating a motion for summary judgment
mirrors that for a directed verdict; as a result, the "mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insuffi-
cient." '' Some commentators, however, have criticized the Supreme
Court for correlating the summary judgment standard with the stan-
dard for directed verdict, in part because a summary judgment motion
is decided on a documentary record that may differ markedly from the
trial evidence that serves as a backdrop for a directed verdict motion. It
has also been argued that the Court's new view of summary judgment
works to the advantage of defendants, transfers power from juries to
judges, impedes settlement, and may actually exact a higher total cost
Beverage Control Div., 10 Ark. App. 139, 662 S.W.2d 181 (1983) (review of agency decision
under Administrative Procedure Act).
119. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Braswell, 198 Ark. 143, 148, 127 S.W.2d 637, 640 (1939).
120. At least one member of the supreme court has expressly stated his view that summary
judgment may be improper even if the evidence is insufficient to support the plaintiffs claim and
the trial court could have directed a verdict for the defendant on the same facts. See Short v.
Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 107, 759 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1988) (Glaze, J., dissenting).
The Hawaii courts, which treat summary judgment as an extraordinary remedy, also take this
position. E.g., McKeague v. Talbert, 658 P.2d 898, 903 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); see generally
Yamamoto et al., supra note 57, at 10-12. The same is true in Texas. E.g., Torres v. Western
Casualty & Surety Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex. 1970); Jones v. General Elec. Co., 543 S.W.2d
882, 884 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976). Indeed, in one case the Texas Supreme Court affirmed a directed
verdict for a defendant despite having previously held that his motion for summary judgment
should be denied. Compare Glenn v. Prestegord, 456 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1970), with Prestegord v.
Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. 1969). See generally Sheila A. Levte, Comment, The Effective Use
of Summary Judgment: A Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards, 40 BAYLOR L. REV.
617, 629-35 (1988).
121. 477 U.S. at 252.
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to the judicial system than it saves that system and its participants. 22
Nonetheless, the federal approach seems basically sound. As the au-
thors of a leading treatise on civil procedure have observed:
Operatively, the notion of a "genuine issue of fact" refers to an issue
that properly can be submitted to a jury. If the nonmoving party can-
not show that the evidence is sufficient to be submitted to a jury, then
there is no justification for a trial, and the purpose of summary judg-
ment is satisfied.
123
Despite the unfortunate reference to the scintilla rule in Thomas,
there is some indication in the case law that the Arkansas Supreme
Court adheres to this view. However, the key decisions - which are
discussed in the following sections - are neither cited nor discussed in
the more recent Thomas case. Moreover, they also appear to have been
undercut by another recent ruling.
B. The Standard of Proof
The Anderson case also holds that a trial court passing on a mo-
tion for summary judgment must take into account the applicable stan-
dard of proof at trial.124 As noted previously, an Arkansas case decided
prior to Anderson indicates that this evidentiary "prism" is irrelevant
at the summary judgment stage. The supreme court subsequently fol-
lowed Anderson in a defamation case, holding that the heightened
"convincing clarity" standard must be employed at the summary judg-
ment stage. More recently, however, the court stated that a nonmoving
party who has the burden of persuasion at trial need not establish his
case by a preponderance of the evidence or by another standard of
proof to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
In the defamation case, Drew v. KATV Television, Inc.,12 5 a law-
yer who served as chairman of a county hospital's board of governors
sued a Little Rock television station on the basis of news broadcasts
that allegedly linked him to a drug investigation at the hospital and
reported, erroneously, that he had been charged with a felony. The trial
122. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 17; Stempel. supra note 17.
123. FLEMING JAMES ET AL.. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.16, at 219 (4th ed. 1992). The authors
recognize that there is some difficulty with the notion of "compar[ing] evidence submitted in
documentary form prior to trial (as in summary judgment) with evidence submitted by live testi-
mony (as at trial) ..... Id. There is considerable scholarly commentary supporting the Supreme
Court's approach. See articles cited supra note 25.
124. 477 U.S. at 254-55.
125. 293 Ark. 555, 739 S.W.2d 680 (1987).
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court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the
supreme court affirmed. After concluding that the plaintiff was a public
official who must, as a matter of constitutional law, prove actual malice
in order to recover, the court held that there was insufficient evidence
of malice to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.12 With respect to the latter issue, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that the actual malice question should have been sub-
mitted to the jury:
[I]n Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. the United States Supreme
Court held that on a motion for suminary judgment, in a case involv-
ing the actual malice standard, the Court must determine whether the
evidence presented could support a reasonable jury finding that actual
malice was shown by clear and convincing evidence. Clearly, the evi-
dence in this case could not support such a finding, and the trial judge
was correct in granting summary judgment.
1 7
On its face, this passage seems to suggest that the court considered
itself bound by Anderson, just as it is bound by the long line of Su-
preme Court decisions that have constitutionalized the law of defama-
tion.128 It is clear, however, that Anderson is bottomed on Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not the First Amendment doc-
trine that. governs libel cases;2 9 as a result, state courts are not com-
pelled to follow it. Accordingly, the Drew decision is best viewed as
adopting, as a matter of state law, the principle that a summary judg-
ment motion must be evaluated in light of the standard of proof -
whether it be preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evi-
126. Id. at 556-57, 739 S.W.2d at 681.
127. Id. at 557, 739 S.W.2d at 681-82 (citation omitted).
128. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Comment, The Law of Defamation: An
Arkansas Primer, 42 ARK. L. REV. 915, 942-74 (1989) (discussing constitutional doctrine and its
impact on state defamation law).
129. The Court expressly held in Anderson that "the determination of whether a given fac-
tual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards
that apply to the case," whether the motion is one for summary judgment or directed verdict. 477
U.S. at 255. The First Amendment simply determines when the more stringent "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard applies; when it does, "the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as
to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury apply-
ing that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." Id.
As Justice Brennan observed in his dissenting opinion, the Court's holding "is not, of course,
confined in its application to First Amendment cases" but "changes summary judgment procedure
for all litigants, regardless of the substantive nature of the underlying litigation." Id. at 257-58,
n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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dence, or some other standard - applicable at trial.' 30 This approach
is consistent with that taken in Arkansas with respect to motions for
directed verdict.' 1
Unfortunately, however, the court's subsequent decision in Baggett
v. Bradley County Farmers Cooperative' suggests that Drew is lim-
ited to defamation actions. In Baggett, the owners of a hog-feeding op-
eration brought suit after several of their hogs became ill after eating
feed purchased from the defendants. Some of the hogs died, while
others suffered stunted growth. The plaintiffs alleged that the hogs' ill-
ness was caused by ingestion of cattle feed, which the defendants had
negligently mixed with hog feed sold to the plaintiffs. While apparently
admitting that they had mixed some dairy pellets for cattle in the hog
feed, the defendants contended that these pellets were not the cause of
the hogs' problems. This argument formed the basis of the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, which was supported by a nutritionist's
affidavit that the tainted feed did not cause the illness and the deposi-
tion testimony of a veterinarian who stated that he could not be sure
that ingesting the cattle feed caused the illness without knowing how
much of it the hogs had eaten. Previously, however, the nutritionist had
not been so definite, having stated in a letter to the plaintiffs that it was
"highly unlikely" that the cattle feed caused the illness. Moreover, the
veterinarian, who had treated the hogs, also testified that cattle feed
could produce enough change inside the hogs' intestines to cause the
illness. 33 The trial court entered summary judgment for the defend-
ants, but the supreme court reversed.
First, the court held that summary judgment was improper be-
cause the trial judge had granted the motion before the day it was set
for hearing. Citing its previous decision in Ragar v. Hooper,' the
court said that "a motion for summary judgment should not be granted
before the day scheduled for a hearing unless it clearly appears that the
130. Generally, the familiar preponderance of the evidence test is employed. See Hess v.
Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 445, 693 S.W.2d 792, 798 (1985); McWilliams v. Neill, 202 Ark. 1087,
1093, 155 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1941).
131. See First Nat'l Bank v. Leonard, 289 Ark. 357, 360-61, 711 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1986)
(noting applicable standard of proof in reviewing trial court's refusal to grant defense motion for
directed verdict). See also Wilson Safety Prods. v. Eschenbrenner, 302 Ark. 228, 231, 788 S.W.2d
729, 732 (1990) (explaining that question on a directed verdict motion at close of plaintiff's case is
"'whether the plaintiff has met the burden of establishing a prima facie case").
132. 302 Ark. 401, 789 S.W.2d 733 (1990).
133. Id. at 402-03, 789 S.W.2d at 734.
134. 298 Ark. 353, 767 S.W.2d 521 (1989).
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nonmoving party could not produce proof contrary to the moving
party's proof." Here, the court said it was "not clear that [the plain-
tiffs] could produce no further proof."' "
Second, the court held that the evidence before the trial judge was
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to cau-
sation. Although this holding was plainly not necessary to the court's
decision in light of its ruling on the timing issue, it cannot easily be
dismissed as ill-considered dicta. On the sufficiency question, the court
concluded that "[a] reasonable inference . . . can be drawn from the
affidavits and depositions ... that the hogs' ingestion of the cattle feed
could have triggered the illness by changing the environment in their
intestines and activating the latent organisms which were already pre-
sent." Because "any doubts concerning a question of fact are to be re-
solved against the moving party," the court held that summary judg-
ment was error.' s6
At this point of the opinion, the court turned to the burden of the
nonmoving party:
It is enough for purposes of resisting the motion for summary judg-
ment that [the plaintiffs] had put before the court sufficient evidence
from which an inference of causation could be drawn. It was not nec-
essary for appellants to establish their case by a preponderance of the
evidence or by any other standard of proof. They were only required
to establish that there was a genuine issue for trial."' 7
135. 302 Ark. at 403, 789 S.W.2d at 734-35.
136. Id. at 404, 789 S.W.2d at 735.
137. Id. To the same effect is the supreme court's recent decision in Dwiggins v. Propst
Helicopters, Inc., 310 Ark. 62, 832 S.W.2d 840 (1992). There the plaintiff sued various defend-
ants, alleging among other things that aerial spraying of a herbicide contaminated a pond used for
irrigation of his tomato crop; that, as a result, he was forced to discontinue watering the crop; and
that the plants subsequently died. The trial court granted summary judgment on this count of the
complaint because there was "no proof of any chemicals involved in the spraying operation being
in the pond water." Id. at 65, 832 S.W.2d at 842.
The supreme court reversed. Summarizing the evidence, the court noted that subsequent tests
on the pond water did not reveal the presence of herbicides and that three of the plaintiff's expert
witnesses "testified by deposition that they were not able to state that the pond was contaminated
by the spraying." Id. Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiff had enough evidence to defeat
the motion for summary judgment:
[T]he plaintiff testified by deposition that vegetation to the edge of the pond was killed
by the spraying. Gerald King, an employee of the State Plant Board, deposed that he
saw hormone-type herbicide damage to brush growing in the edge of the pond, and Ron
Beaty, the local County Agent, testified that common sense would indicate that if the
chemicals were sprayed by a helicopter to the very edge of the pond, then some of the
herbicides would have gotten into the water. Thus, there is some doubt about the fac-
tual issue, and it was error to decide it by summary judgment.
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The court did not cite any authority for this proposition and did not
mention the Drew case. Obviously, the two cases cannot be reconciled,
unless Drew is distinguished as a defamation action in which a height-
ened standard of proof applies. As noted previously, however, this dis-
tinction is not valid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ander-
son, which Drew follows and cites with approval.
C. Celotex and the Movant's Initial Burden
In Collyard v. American Home Assurance Co.,1 38 the supreme
court held that a defendant who moves for summary judgment must
offer proof on a controverted issue in order to shift to the plaintiff the
burden of producing evidence establishing a genuine issue of material
fact. This case made plain that a party moving for summary judgment
cannot satisfy his initial burden by pointing out the absence of proof on
an element of the nonmoving party's claim. However, in Short v. Little
Rock Dodge, Inc.,139 the court followed Celotex in approving this alter-
native method of satisfying the moving party's initial burden.
A comparison of the two cases is instructive. In Collyard, the de-
fendant insurer was sued directly after the plaintiff slipped and fell at
the Hot Springs YMCA, a charitable organization. Rather than sup-
porting its motion for summary judgment with evidence that the
YMCA was not negligent, the defendant cited excerpts from the plain-
tiff's deposition to the effect that she did not know how long the floor
had been wet or how it had gotten that way. The trial court granted
the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence
that the YMCA had negligently put the water on the floor or had acted
negligently in allowing it to remain there.14' The supreme court
reversed:
The [defendant] and trial judge mistakenly presumed that the
burden was on [the plaintiff] to come forward with additional proof
on this issue. The burden in a summary judgment proceeding is on the
moving party; it cannot be shifted when there is no offer of proof on a
Id. at 65-66, 832 S.W.2d at 842.
On these facts, it seems unlikely that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the herbicides had contaminated the pond, particularly in light of the tests per-
formed on the water and the testimony of the plaintiff's own experts. Although there may well be
"some doubt about the factual issue," that is not the relevant inquiry under Anderson.
138. 271 Ark. 228, 607 S.W.2d 666 (1980).
139. 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988).




Whether the YMCA was negligent remained a fact in issue. If
[the defendant] had offered proof that the YMCA was not negligent,
then [the plaintiff] would have had to produce a counter-affidavit or
proof refuting the offer. But that was not the case. The [defendant]
based its motion only on the deposition of . . . the plaintiff.
141
Short arose from a one-vehicle automobile accident in which the
driver, the only eyewitness, was killed. The decedent's mother, acting
on her own behalf and as administratrix of the estate, brought suit
against Chrysler Corporation, the manufacturer of the automobile, and
the dealer from whom the car had been purchased. She alleged strict
liability for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, as well as
negligence on the part of the dealer in failing to correct a stalling prob-
lem. 4" The defendants moved for summary judgment. Like the insur-
ance company in Collyard, they apparently did not offer proof to
counter the plaintiff's allegations, but instead suggested to the trial
court that the summary judgment record did not contain evidence of
causation."" The trial court entered summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff, in response to the defendants' motion, "was unable to
produce evidence that a defect in the car or [the dealer's] negligence in
failing to repair it caused the accident."1 4 '
In affirming the judgment, the supreme court observed that the
plaintiff had presented neither an "affidavit or other statement by any
expert or other person to the effect that the stalling problem caused the
accident" nor evidence "which would have negated other possible
causes of the accident. ' 45 Under these circumstances, the court held,
summary judgment was proper. Without discussing Collyard, the court
said:
141. Id. at 230, 607 S.W.2d at 668.
142. 297 Ark. at 105, 759 S.W.2d at 553.
143. The court's opinion is not crystal clear on this point; it states only that the trial judge
"had before him depositions and responses to requests for admissions and interrogatories." 297
Ark. at 105, 759 S.W.2d at 553. However, the court's summary of those materials indicates that
the defendants attempted to show that the plaintiff had no proof of causation and did not offer
their own evidence tending to negate that element of the plaintiff's claim. According to the court,
the record revealed that the car had been prone to stalling, had stalled earlier on the day of the
fatal accident, had been returned to the dealer for repair, and was a model that Chrysler had
recalled for replacement of a carburetor part to remedy a stalling problem. This evidence came
from the decedent's father, people who had ridden in the car with her, and an experienced
mechanic. Id. at 105-06, 759 S.W.2d at 553-54.
144. Id. at 105, 759 S.W.2d at 553.
145. Id. at 106, 759 S.W.2d at 553.
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In Celotex the Supreme Court interpreted F.R.C.P. 56, which is iden-
tical to our rule in every material respect, as permitting a summary
judgment when a plaintiff cannot offer proof of a material element of
the claim. We agree with the Supreme Court's rationale that when a
party cannot present proof on an essential element of her claim there
is no remaining genuine issue of material fact, and the party moving
for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 146
In light of Short, a defendant moving for summary judgment in an
Arkansas court may satisfy his initial burden by producing evidence
negating the plaintiff's claim 14 7 or by "pointing out" to the trial court
that there is no evidence with respect to an essential element of that
claim. 14 8 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to go beyond the plead-
ings and produce evidence with respect to the element in question.
Under the court's decision in Drew, this evidence must be sufficient, in
light of the standard of proof applicable at trial, to convince a reasona-
ble jury to find in the plaintiff's favor. If, as in Short, the plaintiff
cannot carry this burden, summary judgment is proper.
Taken together, Short and Drew offer strong support for the pro-
position that the Arkansas test for evaluating a motion for summary
judgment mirrors that for a directed verdict. Indeed, the court cited a
directed verdict case in Short while discussing the plaintiffs' failure to
produce evidence in response to the summary judgment motion.1 49
However, this view of the two cases is clearly undercut by subsequent
decisions. As noted previously, Thomas was decided after both Short
and Drew and does not cite either case. More importantly, the court's
statement in Baggett to the effect that the standard of proof is immate-
146. Id. at 106, 759 S.W.2d at 554 (citation omitted).
147. See, e.g., Irvin v. Jones, 310 Ark. 114, 118-19, 832 S.W.2d 827, 829 (1992); Sanders
v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375, 377-78, 830 S.W.2d 861, 862 (1992). As the court observed in Akridge v.
Park Bowling Ctr., Inc., 240 Ark. 538, 401 S.W.2d 204 (1966):
[T]here are undoubtedly instances in which the defendant's motion should be granted
simply because the accompanying proof shows conclusively that some fact essential to
the plaintiff's causes of action is wanting. A commonplace example is the situation in
which the only fault chargeable to the defendant is the negligence of its asserted agent.
If the defendant proves beyond question that no agency existed, and the plaintiff is
unable to offer substantial evidence to the contrary, a summary judgment is proper.
Id. at 540, 401 S.W.2d at 205.
148. But see Muddiman v. Wall, 33 Ark. App. 175, 178-79, 803 S.W.2d 945, 947-48
(1991) (following Collyard but not mentioning Short in reversing a summary judgment).
149. 297 Ark. at 106, 759 S.W.2d at 554 (citing Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 287
Ark. 390, 699 S.W.2d 741 (1985)). See also Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375, 379, 830 S.W.2d
861, 863 (1992) (citing directed verdict decision in holding that summary judgment was appropri-
ate in slip and fall case).
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rial in the summary judgment context indicates that Drew is limited to
defamation cases or, more generally, to cases in which a heightened
standard of proof applies. Unfortunately, the Baggett opinion does not
mention Drew, and it cites Short only for a proposition that goes to
proof in tort actions, not basic summary judgment principles.1 50
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite some encouraging developments, summary judgment in
Arkansas remains an extreme remedy rather than a useful tool for dis-
posing of cases without trial. While the Short opinion relies on Celotex
and points out that Rule 56 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure is
"identical . . . in every material respect" to the corresponding federal
rule, 15 1 the supreme court has not adopted the federal attitude toward
summary judgment so clearly reflected in Celotex, Anderson, and Mat-
sushita. To be sure, the federal courts do not have a monopoly on wis-
dom with respect to procedural matters. In this instance, however, the
federal approach is sound, and there is a great deal to be said for uni-
formity in the interpretation of a state summary judgment rule that
tracks its federal counterpart. 152 From time to time, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has looked to federal decisions in construing Rule 56 of
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. 6  It should now take the next
150. In Baggett, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs, in order to avoid summary judg-
ment, were required to offer proof that would have negated all other possible causes of the hogs'
illness. Citing Short, the supreme court held that this ruling was error because "Itihat standard
applies to product liability cases, . . . not to simple negligence cases." 302 Ark. at 404, 789
S.W.2d at 735. While the court's reference to Short and its use of the term "standard" may be
somewhat confusing, this statement means simply that, as a matter of substantive tort law, a
plaintiff claiming negligence is not required to negate all other causes of his injury. The trial court
in Baggett apparently misread Short, which states only that a plaintiff alleging strict liability on
the basis of product defect may seek to prove causation either by direct proof or by circumstantial
evidence that negates other causes. 297 Ark. at 106, 759 S.W.2d at 553-54. A more detailed
discussion of this point appears in Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 287 Ark. 390, 392-93, 699
S.W.2d 741, 743 (1985), a case cited in Short.
151. 297 Ark. at 106, 759 S.W.2d at 554.
152. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has observed with respect to summary judgment,
"[a] disparity in interpretation (of identical state and federal rules] would inevitably lead to fo-
rum shopping, which has been a perceived evil for at least half a century." Brown v. Credit Ctr.,
Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 364 n.l (Miss. 1983). A recent survey offers some support for this conclu-
sion. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 418-19 (1992) (stating that defense
lawyers who removed cases to federal court reported that availability of summary judgment was
an "important factor" in forum selection in nearly half of the cases).
153. E.g., Joey Brown Interest, Inc. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 298 Ark. 418, 422-23, 683
S.W.2d 601, 604 (1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Newport Hosp. & Clinic, Inc., 281 Ark. 332, 335-
UALR LAW JOURNAL
step and recognize, consistent with Celotex, that summary judgment is
not a "disfavored procedural shortcut."
36, 663 S.W.2d 742, 744 (1984); Turner v. Baptist Medical Ctr., 275 Ark. 424, 427, 631 S.W.2d
275, 277-78 (1982).
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